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"Second Parent" Same-Sex Adoptions Are Valid if in
the Best Interest of the Child: In re Adoption of
R.B.F. and R. C.F.
FAMILY LAW - ADOPTIONS - SAME-SEX COUPLES -- The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that second-parent same-
sex adoptions were permissible if the petitioner could
demonstrate cause that such an adoption would be in the
best interests of the child
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa.
2002)
The validity of "second parent" same-sex adoptions was recently
upheld in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of In re Adoption
of R.B.F. and R.C.F.1 The case arose from two consolidated ap-
peals that raised the same legal and factual issues.2 In both cases,
the superior court upheld the rejection of adoption petitions filed
by same-sex partners to adopt their partners' children on the basis
that the Pennsylvania Adoption Act required the legal or biologi-
cal parent to relinquish parental rights prior to the adoption of a
child by a non-spouse.3  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed, determining that, consistent with the Adoption Act, the
lower courts erred in prohibiting the petitioners from demonstrat-
1. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002)
2. Id. at 1196. In re Adoption of R.B.F., commenced when Appellant, B.A.F., sought to
adopt the natural children of her partner, C.H.F., while C.H.F. maintained her parental
rights of the children. Appellants B.A.F and C.H.F. had been domestic partners since 1983.
After the couple became committed to raising a family, C.H.F. conceived through artificial
insemination. Soon after, B.A.F legally changed her last name to her partner's name to
solidify their commitment. On March 11, 1997, C.H.F gave birth to twin boys. Almost a
year later, on April 24, 1998, B.A.F filed a petition to adopt the boys. Id.
The second case consolidated for appeal, In re Adoption of C.C.G., arose from simi-
lar legal and factual issues. Appellants J.J.G. and J.C.G., a homosexual couple, had been
domestic partners since 1982. Committed to raising a family together, J.J.G. legally
adopted C.C.G. on October 24, 1991 and eight years later on April 24, 1999, legally adopted
Z.C.G. On June 25, 1998, Appellant J.C.G. legally changed his last name to that of J.J.G.
and on May 6, 1999, sought to adopt the children, C.C.G. and Z.C.G. Id.
3. See In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) and In
re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
653
Duquesne Law Review
ing cause that such an adoption would be in the best interest of
the child.4
In both cases, each legal parent submitted consent forms neces-
sary for the adoption.' However, on the consent forms, both legal
parents omitted the language that relinquished their legal paren-
tal rights.6 According to the superior court, the only exception to
the unqualified consent requirement was Section 2903 of the
Adoption Act, which provides that "[w]henever a parent consents
to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child rela-
tionship between him and his child remain."7 The Adoption Act
does not permit a non-spouse to adopt a child where both parents
have not relinquished their parental rights.8
At the trial level, both courts denied the adoption, and the ini-
tial issues raised at the trial level, before the consolidation of the
cases, were identical.9 In the first case, In re C.C.G., the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County determined that the Pennsylvania
Adoption Act prohibited "an eight-year-old boy and a seven-year-
old girl, jointly raised since infancy by both their legally recog-
nized adoptive father and their de facto second father, to establish
a legally recognized relationship with their second father without
destroying the children's existing legal bonds with their legally
recognized adoptive father." ° And in In re R.B.F.", the Common
Pleas Court of Lancaster County determined that the Pennsyl-
4. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1203.
5. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A. 2d at 726; In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A. 2d at
739. The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, in Section 2701 and 2711, requires the legal and
biological parents of the adoptees to sign consent forms relinquishing their rights as a par-
ent. Id. The only exception to this is stated in Section 2903 of the Adoption Act, which per-
mits a spouse of a legal or biological parent to adopt the child without the legal or biological
parents relinquishing their parental rights. Id, 23 Pa. C.S. §2903 (2002).
6. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762A. 2d at 726.
7. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d.at 1197.
8. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, a marriage is only recognized between a man and a
woman, and therefore, appellants do not qualify as a spouse. Id. Since the legal parents of
the children did not relinquish their parental rights and their partner are not considered a
spouse under Pennsylvania law, the appellants do not meet the statutory requirements. Id.
Although the appellants do not meet the statutory requirements, the Pennsylvania Adop-
tion Act leaves the court discretion to permit the adoption if cause is shown why the statu-
tory requirements need not be met. Id. The Statute, 23 Pa. C.S. §2901, states, "Unless the
court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless
the natural parent or parent's rights have been terminated, the investigation required by
section 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of the intermediary
has been filed pursuant to section 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and court may
enter a decree of adoption at any time." 23 Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002).
9. Id.
10. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 726 A.2d at 724-726.
11. In reAdoption of R.B.F., 762 A. 2d 739.
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vania Adoption Act prohibited the biological mother of the chil-
dren to maintain her legal parental rights while the children's de
facto mother became a legally recognized parent through adop-
tion. 
2
Both trial courts strictly applied the Pennsylvania Adoption Act
to forbid the adoptions." Relying on the language of the Pennsyl-
vania Adoption Act, the courts determined that since the petition-
ers were not spouses of the legal or biological parent, they could
not adopt the children without the legal or biological parent first
relinquishing their parental rights. 4 Further, the lower courts
rejected the argument that the appellants had the opportunity to
establish why, although they do not fulfill the statutory require-
ments necessary in the Adoption Act, the adoption should be
granted." Both the trial court and the superior court stated that
the purpose of the "cause shown" language in the statute was to
allow the individuals to show why the statutory requirements
need not be met. 6
The appellants hoped to show, both at the trial level and the in-
termediate level, that even though they did not meet the statutory
requirements, that adoption was in the best interest and general
welfare of the children. 7 The appellants argued that the "'cause
shown' language in Section 2901 [was] tantamount to a best inter-
est of the child analysis."8 A majority of the superior court con-
cluded that "until the statutory requirements have been met, or
cause shown as to why they need not be met, an analysis of the
best interest and general welfare of the children cannot be consid-
ered.""9 The superior court determined that the appellants failed
to "demonstrate cause" and therefore denied adoption.0 In other
words, the superior court did not permit the appellant to demon-
strate why, even though the statutory requirements had not been
12. Id. at 740.
13. Id. at 741.
14. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A. 2d at 742.
15. Id. at 743. Section 2901 of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act states, "[u]nless the
court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decrees of adoption shall be entered..." 23
Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002).
16. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A. 2d at 1197.
17. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A. 2d at 743.
18. Id.




met, the adoption should be permitted for the best interest and
general welfare of the children.2'
On appeal, the issue raised was whether the "Adoption Act re-
quires a legal parent to relinquish his or her parental rights in
cases where a same-sex partner seeks to adopt the legal parent's
child."22 More specifically, the supreme court focused on Section
2901 of the Adoption Act.23 That statute vests the trial court with
discretion to determine whether, under the circumstances of a
particular case, "cause has been shown to demonstrate why a par-
ticular statutory requirement has not been met."24
The appellants argued that they were never given an opportu-
nity to demonstrate why the statutory requirements need not be
met.25 In both cases, the appellants asserted they had the right to
"set forth a factual basis for finding that the purpose of the relin-
quishment provision would be fulfilled by maintaining the chil-
dren's relationship with their existing parent."26
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, siding with the appellants,
reversed.27 The court vacated the decisions and remanded the
cases, granting both appellants the opportunity to demonstrate at
the trial court level why the adoptions should be granted even
though the statutory requirements had not been met.8 The su-
preme court stated that the lower courts erred in prohibiting the
appellants from arguing that they were entitled to show cause un-
der § 2901 that the best interests of the children were to grant the
adoptions.29 The court held that if a best interest of the child
analysis was not permitted until after the statutory requirements
21. Id. at 1196. The superior court relied on In Interest of Coast, which held that a
"'best interest of the child' analysis should not be conducted until after the statutory re-
quirements have been satisfied." In re Interest of Coast, 561 A.2d 572, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000). On appeal, the supreme court determined that In Interest of Coast was not applica-
ble because its "progeny involved statutory requirements necessary to terminate parental
rights, rather than those required for adoption." In re Interest of Coast, 561 A.2d at 579. At
the lower court level, the trial court focused on the decision in In re Adoption of E.M.A.;
however, the supreme court of In re Adoption of R.B.F., rejected the superior court's reli-
ance on E.M.A. In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979). The supreme court de-
termined that the Adoption Act was amended after the ruling in E.M.A. and that the trial
court now has the discretion to grant an adoption even when the statutory requirements
have not been met. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1196.
22. Id. at 1202.
23. 23 Pa. C.S. § 2901 (2002).
24. In re Adoption of R.B.F, 803 A.2d at 1197.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1201.
27. Id. at 1202, n.11
28. Id.
29. In reAdoption of R.B.F., 803 A. 2d at 1202, n.11.
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were established, it would "render the 'cause shown' language
meaningless, as a case proceeding under Section 2901 will most
likely involve a failure to satisfy the statutory requirements.""
According to the supreme court, a determination of 'cause' under
Section 2901 would necessarily involve an examination of the best
interests of the child."3' In fact, the court determined that the
"just cause" language expanded the trial court's discretion to per-
mit the appellants to establish (even though statutory require-
ment may not be met) that they were afforded the rights estab-
lished under the statute.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the lower courts for an evidentiary hearing to allow the appellants
an opportunity to demonstrate why the statutory requirements
need not be met to permit the adoption.33
In 1982, Section 2901 of the Adoption Act was amended to in-
clude the "just cause" language.34 The amendment to 23 Pa. C.S.
§2901 stated,
Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no
decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent
or parents' have been terminated, the investigation required
by section 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed,
the report of the intermediary has been filed pursuant to sec-
tion 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and all other le-
30. Id., n.ll.
31. Id., n.11. Although the superior court recognized the Amended Section 2901, the
lower court determined it did not have an effect on the outcome. The court concluded that:
"[u]ntil the statutory requirements have been met, or cause shown as to why they need not
be met, an analysis of the best interest and general welfare of the child cannot be consid-
ered. A best interest analysis has no place in a determination of whether the statutory
requisites have been met..." In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d at 729. With this determi-
nation, the superior court concluded that the statutory requirements had not been met and
that the appellants had not shown just cause at to why the statutory requirements had not
been met, and therefore, denied the adoption. Id.
32. In reAdoption ofR.B.F., 803 A. 2d at 1203.
33. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A. 2d at 1203. However, the supreme court is quick to
state that the exercise of the trial courts discretion "does not open the door to unlimited
adoptions by legally unrelated adults." Id. Rather, the trial court will use discretion by
focusing on the best interest of the child, without the burden on the appellants of first es-
tablishing the statutory requirements or why those requirements need not be met. Id. The
supreme court states that the superior court's decision was "premised solely on the lack of
unqualified consent by the existing legal parent." Id. However, "there is no language in the
Adoption Act precluding two unmarried same-sex partners (or two unmarried heterosexual
partners) from adopting a child who had no legal parents. Id. It is therefore absurd to pro-
hibit their adoptions merely because their children were either the biological or adopted
children of one of the partners prior to the filing of the adoption petition." Id.
34. 23 Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002).
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gal requirements have been met. If all legal requirements
have been met, the court may enter a decree of adoption at
any time. 5
Three prominent Pennsylvania cases have dealt with the issue
of the "best interest of the child" in custody disputes. One of the
first cases in Pennsylvania to engage in a "best interest of the
child" analysis was In re Rosenthal.6 In that case, the trial court
determined the custody of the Rosenthal children after the par-
ents divorce.37 During the process of divorce, the parents agreed to
a split custody arrangement. 8 The father, after some alleged
problems with the mother's parenting, filed a petition in the
Common Pleas Court of Franklin County to gain complete, cus-
tody.39 The court stated that the agreement set forth by the par-
ents was not binding on its disposition of the case.4° Judge Cun-
ningham stated, "The relationship of parent and child is a
status-not a property right. Parents, whether divorced or not,
have no property right in their child's custody, concerning which
they may make contracts.... ,"' The court continued "'.[w]here the
custody of children is the question, the best interest of the chil-
dren is the paramount fact.'
42
The "best interest of the child" analysis was also applied by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a late-1950's case, The Cochran
Appeal.3 Again dealing with a custody issue, the supreme court
commented, "[t]he law is well settled that '[t]he controlling consid-
eration is the welfare of the child. It is presumed to be for the best
interest of the child to be in the custody of its natural protector, its
parents, and particularly the mother in the case of young chil-
dren."
35. 23 Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002). (Emphasis added). Prior to the amended statute, the
statute read: "Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption
shall be entered unless the adoptee has resided with the petitioner for at least six months
prior to thereto or, in lieu of such residence, the adoptee is at least 18 years of age or is
related by blood or marriage to the petitioner." In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201.
36. In re Custody of Minor Children of Dunbar A Rosenthal, 157 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1931).
37. In re Rosenthal, 157 A. 2d at 343.
38. Id at 343.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 344.
41. Id. at 344.
42. In re Rosenthal, 157 A. 2d at 344, (citing Mr. Justice Brewer, then of the Supreme
court of Kansas, in the case of Petition of Frank B. Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255).
43. Cochran Appeal, 145 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1958).
44. Id. at 858.
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In a later case involving custody issues, Commonwealth v. Mi-
chael,45 the superior court established the relevant factors to con-
sider in a "best interest of the child" analysis: (1) the character
and fitness of the parties seeking custody; (2) their respective
homes; (3) their ability to adequately care for the child; and (4)
their ability to financially provide for the child."
Two appellate court cases have dealt with the interplay between
the "best interest of the child analysis" and termination proceed-
ings. In In re Adoption of R.I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
determined that a "best interest of the child" analysis could not be
used until after the termination statutory requirements were
met.47 The court based its holding on fears that such an analysis
would force courts to compare homes and prejudice the termina-
tion proceedings. 4
In another case involving termination proceedings, In the Inter-
est of Coast, the superior court was faced with the issue of whether
a "best interests of the child" balancing test was appropriate in a
termination proceedings. 4 The court looked into whether the par-
ents were fit to maintain custody of their children." At the trial
court level, the lower court failed to determine whether any addi-
tional factors existed that would render termination adverse to the
children's interests.5 Following Adoption of R.I., the court stated
that the "best interests of the child [could not] be considered until
after a finding that the statutory requirements [had] been met.""
Thus, neither case examined "just cause"" language of 23 Pa. C.S.
§2901.
54
The issue whether a non-spouse may adopt with a parent re-
taining his parental rights was first reached in the supreme court
decision In Re Adoption of E.M.A.. In E.M.A., the specific issue
45. Commonwealth v. Michael R., 436 A.2d 969 (1981 Pa. Super.).
46. Michael R.., 437 A. 2d 969.
47. Idat 297.
48. Id. "The welfare of many children might be served by taking them from their homes
and placing them in what the officials consider a better home." Id. But the Juvenile Court
Law was not intended to provide a procedure to take the children of the poor and give them
to the rich, or to take the children of the illiterate and give them to the cultured, not to take
the children of the weak and sickly and give them to the strong and healthy. Id.
49. In the Interest of Coast, 561 A. 2d 762. (Pa. Super. 1990)
50. Id.
51. Id at 765.
52. Id. at 769, (citing Adoption of R.I., 361 A. 2d at 300 n.12. (Pa. 1976)).
53. 23 Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002).
54. In the Interest of Coast, 561 A.2d at 769.
55. In reAdoption of E.MA., 409 A. 2d 10 (Pa. 1979).
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was whether a third party woman who was not the spouse of the
natural father could adopt the child without the father relinquish-
ing his parental rights." The court determined that the adoption
could not proceed since appellant did not fulfill the necessary re-
quirements of being a spouse to the father." The court explained,
"[O]ur courts have no authority to decree an adoption in the ab-
sence of the statutorily required consents. Nor may exceptions of
the Adoption Act be judicially created where the Legislature did
not see fit to create them."58 In E.M.A., the court did not give itself
authority to look into any adoptions that did not fulfill the statu-
tory requirements. 59
A subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, In re
Adoption of KM.W., relied on its prior ruling in E.M.A. to prohibit
a grandmother from completing a second-parent adoption.0 In
KM.W., the mother sought to retain parental rights while the
child's grandmother adopted the child.61 The court reiterated that
"The Adoption Act does not permit a non-spouse to adopt a child
where both parents have not relinquished parental rights."62
In both E.M.A. and KM.W. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
firmly stated that it would not make exceptions when the statu-
tory requirements were not met.6' However, it is important to
note that these two cases are distinguishable from the consoli-
dated cases at hand, R.B.F. and C.C.G.. E.M.A. was determined
in 1979, three years before the Adoption Act was amended in
1982. Also, in KM.W. the supreme court did not discuss the
amended part of the section, which was at the heart of R.B.F. on
appeal.
The Pennsylvania Adoption Act specifically states that "[a]ny
individual may become an adopting parent."" Although the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has yet to reach the issue, a common
pleas court decision suggests that the Pennsylvania Adoption Act
does not prohibit adoption by two adopters of the same sex. 65 In




60. In reAdoption ofKM. W., 718 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1998).
61. Id at 333.
62. Id.
63. In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A. 2d at 10; In re Adoption of KM.W., 718 A. 2d at
332.
64. 23 Pa. C.S. §2312 (2002).
65. In reAdoption of E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262, 265 (Pa. D &C. 1993).
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that decision, In re Adoption of E.O.G., the Common Pleas Court
of York County focused on the adoption of two foreign children
from Eastern Europe.66 The Eastern European nation (not noted
in the opinion to protect the parties) issued a separate decree of
adoption for each of the two children naming C.MG., one of the
petitioners, as the sole adopting parent. 67 At this time, C.M.G.
brought the children to the United States and raised them with
J.M.B., her lesbian partner, for over ten years.68 C.M.G. and
J.M.B. sought to adopt the children jointly in the United States.
The court concluded that "the statute does not prohibit adoption
by two adopters of the same sex."69 The court further noted, "The
Pennsylvania statute is gender neutral and neither expressly pro-
hibits or condones a 'same sex adoption".7" Since the court deter-
mined that the Adoption Act did not prohibit a homosexual couple
from adopting children, the court focused on whether the adoption
was in the best interest of the children involved."7' Relying on the
superior court holding in Blew v. Verta that "a court may not re-
strict a homosexual parent's custodial right absent a showing that
the partner's sexual relationship with her partner will be harmful
to the child," the trial concluded that granting the adoption would
not be harmful to the child. 72
The ruling in E.O.G. suggests that same-sex adoptions are not
prohibited in the Commonwealth. 3 However, although the Com-
monwealth permits any individual to adopt, certain requirements
must be met before an adoption can be established.74 The joint
adoption in E.O.G. was within the statutory requirements of the
Adoption Act, whereas, in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., the
appellants were not within the statutory requirements of the
Adoption Act.
If the Commonwealth permits joint same-sex adoptions, I see no
reason to prohibit appellants from adopting the children while the
birth or legal parents maintain their parental rights. Although
the Commonwealth prohibits same-sex marriages, adoptions are
66. Id at 262.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 265.
70. In reAdoption of E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 265.
71. Idat 265.
72. In re Adoption of E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262, 265 (1993), (citing Blew v. Verta,
617 A.2d 31, (Pa. Super. 1992)).
73. Id.
74. 23 Pa. C.S. §2901 (2002).
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determined by analyzing what is in the best interest of the child.75
If the best interest of the child is an adoption by a same-sex part-
ner, such an adoption should be permitted by law. Since there are
times in which an adoption by same-sex partners is in the best
interest of the child, there should not be a per se rule that denies
same sex adoptions while one parent maintains his/her parental
rights. It is imperative to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if a
same-sex adoption is within that child's best interest. I agree with
Judge Johnson's dissent in the superior court opinion where he
states:
Courts have gone to great lengths to provide every child with
precisely one mother and one father, the realities of family
formation and parenting are considerably more complex.
Lesbian-mother families are but one alternative to the pre-
sumed form. In resolving disputes about the custody of the
children, the court system should recognize the reality of chil-
dren's lives, however unusual or complex. Courts should de-
sign rules to serve children's best interests. By failing to do
so, they perpetuate the fiction of a family homogeneity at the
expense of the children whose reality does not fit this form. 6
If the couple planning to adopt a child is stable, loving and ca-
pable of supporting and caring for the child, I believe it is in the
child's best interest to permit the adoption. Although there are
concerns that the child may become confused with her own sexual
orientation, or feel different because she has same-sex parents,
this is just one of many factors the court has to look at in deter-
mining if the adoption is in the child's best interest. It is not the
only factor.
The legislature has not specifically prohibited same-sex adop-
tions.77 Until it does, Judge Johnson believes, "[W]e should inter-
pret the laws of our Commonwealth in such a way that adheres to
the mandates of legislature and promotes the placement of chil-
dren in stable families who can provide nurturing and supportive
homes."78 The court must look at the specific facts of each adop-
tion case, determine what is in the best interest of the child and
75. In reAdoption of R.B.F., 803 A. 2d at 1202.
76. In re Adoption ofR.B.F., 762 A. 2d at 748.
77. Id at 750.
78. Id.
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determine the ruling that will promote the child's best interests.79
After all, it is the child's best interest we are concerned with, not
the preservation of the traditional family structure in our society.
Shannon E. Smith
79. Id.
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